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This paper examines the determinants of the Government yields in India using weekly data from 
April 2001 through March 2009. The analysis covers Treasury Bills with residual maturity of 
15-91 days and Government securities of residual maturity one, five and ten years respectively. 
The empirical estimates show that a long-run relationship exists between each of these interest 
rates and the policy rate, rate of growth of money supply, inflation, interest rate spread, foreign 
interest rate and forward premium. At the same time, the empirical results also show that the 
relative importance of the determinants varies across the maturity spectrum. The normalized 
generalized variance decompositions suggest that the policy rate and the rate of growth of high 
powered  money  are  less  important  in  explaining  the proportion of  variation  in  longer term 
interest rates. The weight of the forward premium also diminishes as we move towards higher 
maturity interest rates. The inflation rate is also relatively less important in explaining variations 
in the 10-year rate. The yield spread, on the other hand, is more important in explaining the 
longer term rates.  The results also show that a large proportion of the variation in the rates on 
the 5-year and 10-year government securities is attributed to the interest rate itself suggesting 
that  the  unexplained  variation  may  be  a  result  of  cyclical  factors  that  are  relatively  more 
important for longer term rates but are not captured by the yield spread and are omitted from the 
estimations due to the high frequency of data employed.   
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I. Introduction 
 
Tracking interest rates and understanding their determinants is crucial for both financial 
market participants and policymakers. This is especially true in the case of an economy such as 
India with an evolving financial sector and increasing integration with the global economy.  
After almost two decades of financial liberalisation, the financial markets in India are now fairly 
developed  and  its  monetary policy  is  also comparable to some extent to that of  developed 
countries.  In this scenario, the objective of the study is to examine the impact of domestic 
market forces and external factors on interest rate determination in India across the maturity 
spectrum. The importance of such a study can hardly be over-emphasized given the fact that 
prior to economic reforms in India, not only was the capital account closed, but most of the 
interest rates were also administered. As a result, the interest rates were to a great extent immune 
to both domestic market forces and external factors. In the post-reform period, however, Indian 
financial markets are more integrated and the movement of various rates of interest is generally 
concerted and responsive to market forces. With the onset of financial liberalisation in 1991, 
various segments of the financial market were gradually deregulated and Government securities 
started paying market determined interest rates. The development of the financial markets has 
also improved the transmission of monetary policy and the fixed income Government securities 
market has matured a great deal over the years.
1  
The focus of this study is on the secondary market yields on Government securities on 
a residual maturity basis. Limiting the analysis to zero-default risk Government paper enables 
us to examine a uniform set of securities across the maturity spectrum. The existence of a 
large secondary market for Government securities assures the market players of liquidity as 
the securities can be easily traded. Yet there is a differential in the yields of these securities 
across the  maturity  spectrum.  This  paper  thus  examines  the  relative  influence  of  various 
monetary  and  financial  factors  on  the  short-  and  long-term  weekly  interest  rates  on 
Government Securities  from  April 2001 through March 2009
2. The determinants that are 
considered include the policy rate (repo rate), money supply growth, inflation rate, interest 
rate spread, liquidity, forward premium and foreign interest rates.  
 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows Section 2 describes the salient features of 
the Indian economy with respect to interest rate determination. Section 3 outlines the model 
                                                        
1 See Kanagasabapathy and Goyal(2004)  
2 The starting period allows sufficient time for the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) to stabilise after it was 
introduced on June 5, 2000. 3 
   
for interest rate determination. Section 4 covers the data and methodology and the following 
section reports the empirical results. Section 6 provides the conclusions.  
 
2. Interest Rates and Monetary Policy in India: Some Stylized Facts 
 
The Indian financial system till the early 1990s was characterized by an administered 
structure  of  interest  rates  and  restrictions  on  various  market  players,  viz.  banks,  financial 
institutions,  mutual  funds,  corporate  entities.  Under  the  erstwhile  administered  interest  rate 
regime, the Reserve Bank of India fixed interest rates both on the assets and liability side (of the 
commercial banks) to ensure that the commercial banks had a reasonable spread. Government 
securities had a captive market resulting from the SLR requirement applicable to banks and 
similar  statutory  provisions  governing  investment  of  funds  by  financial  institutions  and 
insurance  companies  facilitated  the  floatation  of  debt  at  relatively  low  interest  rates.  Since 
lending  and  borrowing  operations  did  not  involve  any  interest  rate  risk,  there  was  no  real 
incentive for the market players to actively manage their assets and liabilities. Moreover, in this 
era the public sector banks were not driven by the profit motive. There were also restrictions on 
the portfolio allocation in the form of specified targets. All these factors culminated in the lack 
of adequate volumes as a result of which the market lacked depth and liquidity.  
It may be mentioned here that alongside the developments in the Government securities 
market, the banking sector was also evolving to a significant extent in response to financial 
sector reforms initiated as a part of structural reforms encompassing trade, industry, investment 
and external sector, launched by the Central Government in the early 1990s in. A high-powered 
Committee  on  the  Financial  System  (CFS)  was  constituted  by  the  Government  of  India  in 
August  1991  to  examine  all  aspects  relating  to  the  structure,  organisation,  functions  and 
procedures of the financial system (Chairman: Mr. M. Narasimham). Financial sector reforms 
were initiated as part of overall structural reforms to impart efficiency and dynamism to the 
financial sector. It was highlighted that one of the major factors that affected banks‟ profitability 
was high pre-emption of their resources. Accordingly, a phased reduction in the SLR and the 
CRR was undertaken beginning January 1993 and April 1993, respectively.  There was a sharp 
reduction in the Central Government‟s fiscal deficit in the initial years of reforms. Accordingly, 
there was less of a need to use the banking sector as a captive source of funds. Interest rates on 
Government securities were also made more or less market determined in 1992.   
In this context the operationalisation of the landmark historic agreements between the 
Reserve  Bank  and  the  Central  Government  in  September  1994  that  phased  out  automatic 4 
   
monetisation of fiscal deficits through ad hoc Treasury Bills turned out to be valuable in many 
respects.  It  brought  about  a  shift  from  the  administered  interest  rate  to  market-determined 
interest  rates  and  made  the  Government  more  conscious  of  the  true  costs  of  its  borrowing 
programme imparting fiscal discipline. The move towards bond financing induced conditions for 
increased private capital formation. It freed monetary policy from the fiscal deficit‟s straitjacket 
and allowed the interest rate to reflect the opportunity cost of holding money among financial 
and other assets so as to improve its allocative efficiency (Jalan, 2002)
3.  
In conjunction with these developments the commercial banks were also given freedom 
to fix their own deposit and lending rates depending on commercial judgment, subject to the 
approval of their boards.  The process of deregulation of interest rates - that took place over the 
period 1994 to 1997- enhanced the prominence of interest rates in monetary policy. It ushered in 
a  greater  role  to  market  forces  and  enabled  a  shift  from  direct  to  indirect  instruments  of 
monetary policy. The prominence of the interest rate channel increased after financial sector 
liberalization, a greater role assigned to the policy rates, the Bank rate and later to the repo rate. 
The Reserve Bank‟s Working Group on Money Supply (1998) underscored the significance of 
the interest rate channel of monetary transmission in a deregulated environment. This was, in 
fact, the underlying principle of the multiple indicator approach that was adopted by the Reserve 
Bank during 1998-99, whereby a set of economic variables (including interest rates) were to be 
monitored along with the growth  in  broad  money,  for  monetary policy purposes.  Monetary 
Policy Statements of the Reserve Bank in recent years have also emphasized the preference for a 
soft and flexible interest rate environment within the framework of macroeconomic stability.
4  
Interest rates across various financial markets have been progressively rationalized and 
deregulated during the reform period. The reforms have aimed towards the easing of quantitative 
restrictions, removal of barriers to entry, wider participation, and increase in the number of 
instruments  and  improvements  in  trading,  clearing  and  settlement  practices  as  well  as 
informational flows. Besides, the elimination of automatic monetization of Government budget 
deficit, the progressive reduction in statutory reserve requirements and the shift from direct to 
indirect instruments of monetary control, have impacted upon the structure of financial markets 
and the enhanced role of interest rates in the system.  
Financial liberalization has made it possible for the monetary authority to shift to the 
indirect instruments for conduct of monetary policy. The process on monetary policy making 
                                                        
3 Also see Report on Currency and Finance , 2006. 
4 Along with these developments the external sector dynamics was changing fast, the exchange rates were first 
made flexible  and then left to the market forces increasing the role of the exchange rate channel with increasing 
global integration. 5 
   
also underwent a change; see Nachane and Raje (2007) for details of how monetary policy 
changed in India with liberalisation. 
Since April 1992, the Central Government borrowing programme has been conducted 
largely through auctions enabling market based price discovery. As a result of the institutions 
of market related interest rates on Government borrowing, OMOs, hitherto ineffective, gained 
considerable momentum. There has been a gradual shift in emphasis from direct to indirect 
instruments of policy - OMOs and repos have been actively used to influence the level of 
reserves available with banks. To augment the effectiveness of this instrument, greater efforts 
are being made to widen and deepen the money, foreign exchange and gilts markets and 
strengthen the banking system.  Along the maturity continuum, the Government Securities 
market has also become very active and today there are various influences that drive the 
interest rates. Once the Government security market was freed, the dynamics changed with 
respect to public sector banks that were the major holders of Government bonds. Now in the 
freer environment, the public sector banks were required to handle interest rate risk, market 
risk by managing their assets and liabilities appropriately. This fostered a greater emphasis on 
the treasury management in banks across the board. Consequently, an element of competitive 
pricing and substitutability in response to interest rate movements gradually entered into the 
operations of banks and institutions leading to market integration.  
The  Government  Securities  market  gathered  depth  and  breadth  with  a  number  of 
institutional  and  technological  measures  introduced  by  the  Reserve  Bank  of  India.  The 
foremost  of  these  were  the  setting  up  of  Discount  and  Finance  House  of  India  (DFHI), 
Securities  Trading  Corporation  of  India  (STCI)  and  the  introduction  of  Primary  Dealers 
system  in  1996.  These  measures  enhanced  the  liquidity  and  depth  in  the  markets.  The 
Primary Dealers ensured maximum participation in the primary auctions and provided two-
way quotes. Another significant step was the introduction of the scheme of Ways and Means 
Advances after the phasing out of ad-hoc treasury bills. Apart from these reform measures, 
markets  were  gradually  opened  to  the  non-bank  participants  since  the  shift  from  the 
administered interest rates to a market based pricing of securities attracted larger participation 
including the non-banks. Computerization of Statutory General Ledger (SGL) operations and 
dissemination  of  information  on  secondary  market  trading  imparted  considerable 
transparency  in  the  trading  and  settlement  system  for  Government  securities  markets.  
Recognizing the importance of the payment systems, a number of initiatives were undertaken 
for  bringing  about  efficiency  in  the  payment  and  settlement  systems.  These  include  the 
implementation of the real time gross settlement (RTGS) and introduction of the Negotiated 6 
   
Dealing System (NDS) in February 2002 to facilitate electronic bidding, secondary market 
trading and settlement and to disseminate information on trades on a real time basis. These 
developments enabled the Government Securities market to leap frog on technology. Both in 
terms  of  volume  and  value,  the  transactions  in  the  Government  Securities  market  have 
increased significantly in recent years. In India, the spread of the RTGS system was very 
rapid  in  comparison  with  other  countries.  Effective  funds  movements  through  the  RTGS 
platform also greatly helped the cash management by banks and the Government Securities 
market. 
 Today  the  Government  Securities  market  is  vibrant  and  has  acquired  significant 
depth and liquidity that has resulted in growing volumes. Significant activity level in the 
secondary market has helped the development of the yield curve and the term structure of 
interest rates. With the opening up of the economy, the international developments and the 
international  interest  rates  have  come  to  bear  upon  the  domestic  rates.  Collateralised 
Borrowing  and  Lending  Obligations  (CBLOs)  were  operationalised  as  a  money  market 
instrument through the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) in January 2003. With 
a view to developing the market for this instrument, the Reserve Bank introduced automated 
value-free transfer of securities between market participants and the CCIL during 2004-05. 
Now  a  significant  repo  market  outside  the  LAF  has  been  assiduously  developed  by  the 
Reserve Bank to provide an avenue for bank and non-bank participants to trade funds after 
the  conversion  of  the  call/notice  money  market  into  a  pure  inter-bank  market.  With  the 
initiation  of  the  process  of  financial  liberalisation,  the  financial  markets  have  become 
progressively  integrated  as  is  evident  from  the  closer  alignment  of  interest rates.  Market 
integration has also implied that the interest rate channel of monetary transmission has gained 
some strength  in recent  years.  Now the  market repo and the interbank  market have  both 
geared  to take  care of  the  short term  liquidity  in  the  system.  There  is  a  correspondence 
between changes in monetary policy stance and the movement in yields of money market 
securities, Treasury bills and Government dated securities.  
There  are  various  factors  that  influence  the  movement  of  interest  rates  in  India. 
Determinants of interest rates can be looked at as market forces of demand and supply of 
liquidity that are key determinants of the market determined rates. The RBI conducts its day-
to-day operations by maintaining adequate liquidity in the system. The Reserve Bank has put 
in place a liquidity management framework to manage daily liquidity, taking into account the 
country-specific features. The market interest rates are affected by a series of factors, like the  
RBI's decisions to alter the quantum of liquidity in the system; or changes that it may make in 7 
   
the required reserve ratios; changes in the level of Government balances with RBI and its use 
of the WMA facility. The LAF window is used to modulate liquidity through judicious fixing 
of the repo-reverse repo informal corridor. The other route is open market operations where 
the  RBI  operates  through  purchase  and  sale  of  securities  through  the  auction  route.  The 
Market Stabilization Scheme (MSS) was introduced in early 2004 to absorb excess liquidity 
generated on account of the accretion of the foreign exchange assets of the Bank to neutralise 
the monetary impact of capital flows. The MSS is an arrangement between the Government 
of India and the Reserve Bank to mop up excess liquidity. Under the scheme, the Reserve 
Bank issues treasury bills/dated Government securities by way of auctions (and the cost of 
sterilisation is borne by the Government) on behalf of the Government and the money raised 
is impounded in a separate account with the RBI. The MSS has provided the Reserve Bank 
with  an  additional  instrument  of  liquidity  management  and  to  relieve  the  LAF  from  the 
burden  of  sterilisation  operations.  The  unwinding  of  the  MSS  or  what  is  known  as  de-
sequestering is also used as a key instrument of liquidity management. The FII investment in 
the G-Sec market is capped at US $ 5billion limiting the direct impact of foreign money. 
Summing up, the RBI has a multipronged impact on the market through the repo rate/reverse 
repo rate, the mechanism of LAF auctions, open market operations and direct changes in 
CRR all of which impact on the market interest rates through the liquidity in the system as 
























The  present  paper  focuses  on  the  yield  rates  on  Government  Securities  in  the 
secondary  market on residual  maturity  basis so  as to eliminate the differential  impact of 
various risks, liquidity or convertibility. As far as the Government Bond market is concerned 
the shorter rates are again influenced by similar near term factors while the longer rates are 
driven by fundamentals. In the Indian context we use the Repo rate as the policy rate. In 
recent years the repo rate has emerged as a reference rate as also a signaling mechanism for 
monetary  policy  actions  while  the  LAF  has  been  effective  both  as  a  tool  for  liquidity 
management as well as a signal for interest rates in the overnight market.   
 
The liquidity in the system is also influenced by „autonomous‟ factors like the Ways 
and Means  Advances (WMA) to the Government. The  interest rates are also affected by 
developments in the foreign exchange markets, macroeconomic activity, actual and expected 
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Interest rates are determined by a number of macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, their 
impacts may differ depending upon the maturity spectrum of the interest rates. For instance, 
for  short-term/medium-term  rates,  factors  that  might  impact  interest  rates  include  monetary 
policy, liquidity, demand and supply of credit, actual and expected inflation, and external factors 
such  as  foreign  interest  rates.  For  long-term  interest  rates,  demand  and  supply  of  funds, 
economic  activity  and  expectations  about  government  policy  might  be  relatively  more 
important.  
Some of these factors also emerge from the stylised model developed by Dua and 
Pandit (2002) under covered interest parity condition. The equation for the real interest rate 
derived from their model can be expressed as a function of expected inflation, foreign interest 
rate, forward premium, and variables to denote fiscal and monetary effects as given below: 
 
r = f (g, m, 
e , i*, fp) 
   
where r denotes the real rate of interest; g is real government expenditure; m denotes real 
money  supply;  
e  is  expected  inflation;  i*  is  the  foreign  interest  rate;  and  fp  is  forward 
premium.  
Dua and Pandit (2002) estimate the cointegrating relationship using monthly data for 
India from  March 1993 to May 2000 for three interest rates, viz., 3-month and 12-month 
Treasury bill rates and the commercial paper rate. The cointegrating relationship for each of 
the  interest rates  suggests that while real  money supply  is  negatively related to the real 
interest rate, real government. expenditure, forward premium and the foreign interest rate 
have positive signs. Furthermore, real money supply, real government expenditure, foreign 
interest rate, forward premium and the domestic inflation rate Granger cause the domestic 
real interest rate.  
  Dua et al. (2008) develop vector autoregressive (VAR), vector error correction (VEC) 
and Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR) models to forecast Indian short-term and long-
term rates, viz. call money rate, 15-91 days Treasury bill rate and rates on 1-year, 5-years and 
10-years government securities. Since weekly data is used to estimate the multivariate models 
over the period April 1997 to December 2001 (with out-of-sample forecast period as January 
2002 to June 2004), financial and monetary factors available at this high frequency such as 
inflation rate,  policy rate, yield spread, liquidity, foreign interest rates and forward premium 
are considered. The study reports that all the variables significantly Granger cause the various 
interest rates, thus justifying their inclusion in the model. 10 
   
  The use of weekly data obviously restricted the selection of variables for inclusion in the 
models. Variables such as measures of current and future economic activity and fiscal policy 
could not be included due to unavailability of data at the weekly frequency.  
  Nevertheless,  some  of  these  effects  can  be  captured  in  financial  spreads  that  are 
measured  by  differences  in  the  yields  on  financial  assets.  These  spreads  exist  due  to 
differences in liquidity, risk and maturity that can also be influenced by factors such as taxes 
and portfolio regulations. Cyclical changes in any of these factors can arise from monetary 
policy  shifts  leading to changes  in  financial spreads. The  most commonly  used  financial 
spread  is  the  yield  spread  whose  role  in  predicting  future  changes  in  interest  rates  is 
documented  in  several  articles  including  Campbell  and  Shiller  (1991),  Froot (1989),  and 
Sarantis and Lin (1999).  
  The slope of the yield curve – the difference between the long-term interest rate and 
the  short-term  interest  rate,  measures  the  yield  spread.  According  to  the  expectations 
hypothesis of the term structure, this yield differential provides an indication of the expected 
future inflation rate (Mishkin, 1989). It also provides a signal about growth in future output. 
For instance, tight monetary policy and high short-term interest rates can imply a declining 
yield curve and thus a slowdown in future output growth. Thus the inclusion of the yield 
spread in the forecasting models in Dua et al. served as a proxy for the expected inflation rate 
and the economic activity.  The specification employed in Dua et al. is applied in this study.  
  Following Dua et al, the variables of interest are as below:  
   
i = f (policy rate, liquidity, 
 , yield spread, i*, fp) 
 
In  the  above  specification,  the  policy  rate  and  the  quantum  of  liquidity  capture  the 
impact of monetary policy. Monetary policy plays an important role in the determination of 
interest rates although the extent of influence and the transmission effect depends on whether 
interest rates  are regulated or  market  determined and on the  degree of development of the 
financial  markets.  The  operating  procedures  of  monetary  policy  vary  a  great  deal  across 
countries. Nevertheless, one common feature across countries in recent years is that the shorter 
term interest rates have emerged as key  indicators of the monetary policy stance across the 
globe. Central banks can influence interest rates either directly through a policy rate change or 
indirectly by changing the quantum of liquidity in the system, through various other instruments, 
such open market operations. It is expected that the more developed the financial market, the 
greater is the adjustment by the market in response to a cue from the central bank. In the case of  11 
   
developed countries, the mere announcements of the monetary authority are adequate to align 
the markets. Thornton (2000) has discussed how by just announcing the desired level of the 
interest rate, central banks can align the market players to new levels of interest rates. In this 
scenario, "open mouth operations" may be enough and open market operations may not be 
required
5.  Central banks of developing countries may, however, face some constraints on the 
transmission  of  their  monetary  policy  impulses.  This  often  occurs  due  to  the  existence  of 
segmentation in markets and/or administered interest rates.  
In an attempt to gauge the impact of a change in the policy rate on the market interest 
rate, Cook and Hahn (1989) show that the changes in the federal funds rate target influences 
the shorter term rates more than the longer term rates. These results are reinforced by a recent 
study by Piazzesi (2005) that demonstrates that as monetary-policy shocks affect short rates 
more than long ones, they change the slope of the yield curve. Nevertheless, while there may 
be a differential in the extent of impact on the short vs long rates, the sign of the policy rate is 
expected to be positive.   
The liquidity aspect of monetary policy can be captured by money supply growth
6. It 
is noteworthy, however, that besides the liquidity effect of money growth on interest rates 
whereby a rise in money growth is expected to cause a decline in interest rates, money supply 
growth also has an inflation expectation effect wherein an increase in money supply growth 
impacts interest rates upwards through inflation expectations. The sign on the money supply 
growth  thus  depends  on  the  relative  strength  of  the  two  effects.  According  to  Cochrane 
(1989) the "anticipated inflation effect dominates if money growth is a good predictor of 
future money growth if the lag from money growth to inflation is short, and if changes in 
money growth are largely anticipated." He indicated that the liquidity effect should dominate 
if "short-term changes in money growth are typically not interpreted as signals that long-term 
policy has changed, if the lag from money to inflation is long, and if changes in  money 
growth are largely unanticipated. Furthermore, the existence of a liquidity effect implies that 
(expected) real returns vary over time." 
7   
The inflation rate is another important determinant of interest rates. This has been 
incorporated in various studies in different ways. For example, Rudebusch and Wu (2008) as 
                                                        
5 The extent of intervention that is required is purely a reaction to the kind of channels of transmission in the 
system as illustrated by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). In recent times communication or merely talking about 
monetary policy has become very important in the transmission process of monetary policy and in this context, 
Blinder (2008) has illustrated the virtues (and vices) of central bank communication.  
 
6 Dua et al. (2008) construct a measure of liquidity based on bank reserves. Money supply growth, however, 
gave a better fit in the current study and is therefore used here.    
7 Cochrane (1989), p. 75. 12 
   
well  as  Bekaert,  Cho  and  Moreno  (2005),  show  that  the  inflation  rate  targeted  by  the 
monetary authority, or the long run equilibrium inflation rate is a crucial determinant of the 
term structure. Rudebusch and Wu (2008) show that the level of the interest rate is affected 
by the market participants' views about the underlying or medium- term inflation target of the 
central bank.   
The importance of the yield spread in predicting interest rates and serving as a proxy 
for economic activity and future inflation has already been discussed earlier in the text.  To 
elaborate, a rise in short-term rates induced by tight monetary policy is likely to result in a 
slowdown in real economic activity and thus the demand for credit. This reduction in demand 
is likely to reduce short rates and since long-term rates can be defined as the average of the 
expected  short-term  rates,  this  causes  them  to  fall.  Thus  the  yield  spread  defined  as  the 
differential between the long-term and short-term rate also decreases resulting in a flatter 
yield curve.  Changes in the slope of the yield curve are therefore predictors of economic 
activity with a flattening of the curve accompanied by reduced inflation expectations. In the 
equation  for  the  interest  rate,  the  yield  spread  as  defined  above  therefore  enters  with  a 
positive sign.   
The  foreign  interest rate and the  forward premium  reflect the  integration between 
domestic  and  global  markets  and  the  fact  that  the  Indian  money  and  foreign  exchange 
markets have become intrinsically linked to each other, especially in view of the commercial 
banks having a dominant presence in both these markets. The world interest rate and the 
domestic rate are expected to be positively related since a rise in the foreign interest rate 
would lead to an outflow of capital implying a fall in the demand for domestic bonds and a 
rise in the domestic rate of interest. Finally, an increase in the forward premium is likely to 
result  in  an  expectation  of  depreciation  of  the  domestic  currency  raising  the  demand  for 
foreign bonds relative to domestic bonds. This would result in lower domestic bond prices 
and a  higher domestic rate of  interest.  Thus, the  forward premium  is expected to bear a 
positive coefficient.  
  The expected signs of the variables are therefore as follows: 
          Expected Signs of Independent Variables 
   
 
 
Variables  Expected Sign 
Policy rate  + 
Liquidity (dm)  +/- 
  + 
yield spread  + 
i*  + 
fp  + 13 
   
                                  
It is expected that monetary policy variables would have a larger impact on shorter term rates 
while variables that denote economic activity, such as the yield spread would have a bigger 
effect on longer term rates.  
 
4. Data and Empirical Model  
The  interest  rates  in  this  study  are  weekly  observations  on  yields  to  maturity  on 
riskless Government securities. The interest rates examined are Treasury bills 15 to 91 days, 
and Government securities with residual maturity of 1, 5 and 10 years. The term spread or the 
variation  in  rates  across  these  securities  is  due  to  their  term  to  maturity  only  as  these 
Government securities do not differ in default risk, liquidity, marketability risk, tax effects 
and convertibility.   
The rates are  based on the  secondary  market outright transactions  in Government 
securities as reported in the Subsidiary Government Ledger (SGL) accounts at the Reserve 
Bank of India, Mumbai. The data are taken from the Handbook of Statistics on the Indian 
Economy and are described in the annexure. The period of analysis is from April 2001 to 
March 2009.   
  The variables included in the models used in the present study are based on the analysis 
in the previous section and are as follows: policy rate (repo rate
8); inflation - π (calculated from 
wholesale price index);  yield spread (10 years Government security rate minus Treasury Bill 
rate of residual maturity 15-91 days); liquidity in the system (rate of growth of high powered 
money); foreign interest rates - i*1 and i*2 respectively (Libor 3 months and 6 months); and 
forward premium on exchange rate of US dollar for 3 and 6 months respectively -  fp1 and fp2 .  
The specific variables included in the various models are given below: 
Model A: Treasury Bill rate (15-91 days) 
i(TB15-91)= f(Repo rate, dm, π,  Spread, i*1, fp1) 
 
Model B: Government Security 1 year 
i(GSec1)= f(Repo rate, dm, π,  Spread, i*2, fp2) 
 
Model C: Government Security 5 years 
i(GSec5)= f(Repo rate, dm, π, Spread, i*2, fp2) 
                                                        
8 In the Indian context we use the repo rate that has emerged as a reference rate as also a signaling mechanism 
for monetary policy actions 
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Model D: Government Security 10 years 
i(GSec10)= f(Repo rate, dm, π, Spread, i*2, fp2) 
 
The model specifications are essentially the same apart from the use of the 3 months Libor 
and forward premium employed in the specification of the Treasury bill rate compared to the 
6 months rates in other models
9.  
   







































































































































































































































































































































































































































i(TB 15-91) gsec1 gsec5 gsec1 0
 
 
  A preliminary analysis of the data employed in the study is presented in Tables 1, 2A 
and 2B and Chart 2. Summary statistics for the interest rates given in Table 1 show that the 
mean  value  increases  with  term  to  maturity.    Chart  2  as  well  as  the  correlation  matrix 
reported in Table 2A shows that there is significant co-movement in the interest rates across 
                                                        
9 This specification was confirmed by the empirical estimations.  
 15 
   
the maturity spectrum. The data also show that the policy rate is highly correlated with the 
other interest rates. The strength of the correlation between the growth rate of high powered 
money and the interest rates declines as we move towards higher maturity interest rates; the 
direction  of  correlation  remains  positive  throughout.  Furthermore,  the  inflation  rate  is 
correlated to a larger extent to the shorter term interest rates than to those of longer maturity. 
The correlation matrix also shows that the foreign interest rate and the forward premia are 
positively related to the interest rates. The interest rate spread is positively related to the 
longer  term  interest  rates  with  the  magnitude  being  higher  for  the  10-year  Government 
security compared to the 5-year security.  
  The correlation  matrix  between the  independent variables  also displays  interesting 
trends. The correlations between 3- and 6-month Libor is 3- and 6-month forward premia  
respectively are close to one.  The repo rate is reasonably correlated with the foreign interest 
rate and forward premia (correlation coefficient around 0.5) and the rate of growth of high 
powered money is also reasonably correlated with the inflation rate and the foreign interest 
rate.  A caveat here is that the correlation analysis given above is merely indicative since the 
correlation coefficients are not tested for statistical significance and that the relationships 
between  variables  are  best  tested  in  a  multivariate  framework.  A  detailed  econometric 
analysis is therefore necessary. 
 
     
5. Econometric Methodology  
 
This paper analyses the relationship between the various interest rates examined in 
this  study  and  their  determinants  in  a  cointegration  framework.  The  interest  rates  are  as 
follows: Treasury bill 15-91 days rate and Government securities with residual maturity of 1, 
5 and 10 years rates. The determinants include the repo rate, rate of growth of high powered 
money, inflation rate, interest rate spread, foreign interest rate and forward premium.    
A test for nonstationarity is first conducted followed by tests for cointegration and 
Granger causality. Generalized variance decompositions are then examined. 
 
Tests for Nonstationarity 
 
The classical regression model requires that the dependent and independent variables in 
a regression be stationary in order to avoid the problem of what Granger and Newbold (1974) 
called „spurious regression‟ characterized by a high R
2, significant t-statistics but results that are 
without  economic  meaning.  A  stationary  series  exhibits  mean  reversion,  has  a  finite,  time 
invariant variance and a finite covariance between two values that depends only on their distance 
apart in time, not on their absolute location in time. If the characteristics of the stochastic process 16 
   
that  generated  a  time  series  change  overtime,  i.e.  if  the  series  is  nonstationary,  it  becomes 
difficult to represent it over past and future intervals of time by a simple algebraic model. Thus 
the first econometric exercise is to test if all the series are nonstationary or have a unit root. 
A battery of unit root tests now exists to discern whether a time series exhibits I (1) 
(unit root) or I (0) (stationary) behaviour. In this study, we employ the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (1979, 1981) ADF test and its more powerful variant, the Dickey-Fuller generalized 
least squares (DF-GLS) test proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). These two 
tests share the same null hypothesis of a unit root.  
To test if a sequence yt contains a unit root using the ADF procedure, three different 
regression equations are considered. 
                               
yt=  + yt-1 + t + iyt-i+1 + t   (1) 
                                i=2     
 
                          p 
yt=  + yt-1 + iyt-i+1 + t                (2) 
                         i=2 
                   p 
yt= yt-1 + iyt-i+1 + t                  (3) 
                  i=2 
 
The most general form of the D-F test (equation 1) allows for both a drift term and a 
deterministic  trend;  the  second  excludes  the  deterministic  trend;  and  the  third  does  not 
contain an intercept or a trend term. In all three equations, the parameter of interest is . If 
=0, the yt sequence has a unit root. The null is therefore γ=0 against the alternative γ≠0. The 
estimated t-statistic is compared with the appropriate critical value in the Dickey-Fuller tables 
to determine if the null hypothesis is valid. The critical values are denoted by ,  and  for 
equations (1), (2) and (3) respectively. The D-F test presumes the existence of white noise 
errors in the regression; hence lags of the dependent variable are added to the regressions to 
whiten the errors. 
Following Doldado, Jenkinson and Sosvilla-Rivero (1990), a sequential procedure is 
used to test for the presence of a unit root when the form of the data-generating process is 
unknown.  This  involves  testing  the  most  general  model  (equation  1)  first  and  following 
various tests,  moving to the  most parsimonious  model (equation 3). Such a procedure  is 
necessary since including the intercept and trend term reduces the degrees of freedom and the 
power of the test implying that we may conclude that a unit root is present when, in fact, this 
is  not true. Further, additional regressors  increase the absolute value of the critical  value 
making it harder to reject the null hypothesis. On the other hand, inappropriately omitting the 17 
   
deterministic terms can cause the power of the  test to go to  zero (Campbell and Perron, 
1991). 
  Compared to the ADF test, the DF-GLS test has substantially improved power when an 
unknown  mean  or  trend  is  present  (Elliot  et  al.,  1996).  The  DF-GLS  procedure  relies  on 
demeaning  and/or  detrending  a  series  prior  to  the  implementation  of  the  auxiliary  ADF 
regression as follows: 
                                y
d
t = yt – φzt                    (4) 
 
For  detrending,  zt=(1,t)and  φ0  and  φ1  are  estimated  by 
regressing ] ) 1 ,.......( ) 1 ( , [ 2 1 T y L y L y       on  ] ) 1 ,.......( ) 1 ( , [ 2 1 T z L z L z       where 
) / ( 1 T c     with  c = -13.5, and L is the lag operator. For demeaning, zt=(1) and the same 
regression is run with  c = -7.0. (see Elliott et al., 1996 for details).  The augmented Dickey-
Fuller regression is then computed using the y
d
t series: 
                                     p 
y
d
t=  + y
d
t-1 + t + iy
d
t-i+1 + t   (5) 
                                    i=2     
 
Critical values for the GLS detrended test are taken from Elliott et al. (1996). Critical values for 
the GLS demeaned test are the same as those applicable to the no-constant, no-trend ADF test. 
 
 
Cointegration and Granger Causality 
 
Cointegration  refers  to  a  long-run  equilibrium  relationship  between  nonstationary 
variables that together yield a stationary linear combination. Although the variables may drift 
away from the equilibrium for a while, economic forces act in such a way so as to restore 
equilibrium. The possibility of a cointegrating relationship between the variables is tested using 
the Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992) methodology which is described below. 
Consider the p-dimensional vector autoregressive model with Gaussian errors:  
 
t p t p t t A y A y A y         0 1 1 ......  
 
where  t y  is an  1  m  vector of I(1) jointly determined variables. The Johansen test assumes 
that the variables in  t y  are I (1). For testing the hypothesis of co integration the model is 











where,   
  
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Here the rank of Π is equal to the number of independent co integrating vectors. If the 
vector yt is I(0), Π will be a full rank m  m matrix. If the elements of vector yt are I(1) and co 
integrated with rank (Π) = r, then      , where  α and β are m  r  full  column rank 
matrices and there are r < m linear combinations of yt. Then β’ is the matrix of coefficients of 
the co integrating vectors and α is the matrix of speed of adjustment coefficients.  










1 '  
If there are non-zero co-integrating vectors, then some of the elements of α must also 
be non zero to keep the elements of yt from diverging from equilibrium. The model can easily 
be extended to include a vector of exogenous I(1) variables. 
 
Johansen  and  Juselius  (1990,  1992)  suggest the  likelihood  ratio test  based  on  the 
maximum  eigenvalue  and  trace  statistics  to  determine  the  number  of  the  cointegrating 
vectors. Since the eigenvalue test has a sharper alternative hypothesis as compared to the 
trace test, it is used to select the number of cointegrating vectors in this paper. 
 
If the variables are indeed cointegrated, an error correction model can be estimated 
with  the  lagged  value  of  the  residual  from  the  cointegrating  relationship  as  one  of  the 
independent variables (in addition to lagged values of other variables described above), the 
left-hand side variable being as above.  The error correction model captures the short-term 
dynamics of the variables in the system. These dynamics represent the movements of at least 
some of the variables in the system in response to a deviation from long-run equilibrium. 
Movements in these variables ensure that the system returns to the long-run equilibrium.  
 
Granger Causality  
The  concept  of  Granger  causality  can  be  tested  in  the  framework  of  the  error 
correction model. The Granger causality approach analyses how much of the current variable 
yt can be explained by its own past values and tests whether adding lagged values of other 
variables  can  improve  its  forecasting  performance.  If  adding  lagged  values  of  another 
variable, xt does not improve the predictive ability of yt, we say that xt does not Granger 
cause yt. In the error correction framework, Granger-causality can be tested by a joint 
2 test 
of the error correction term and the lags of xt . 
While cointegration gives the long-run relationship between variables and Granger-
causality  throws  light  on  the  predictive  ability  of  other  variables,  innovation  accounting 19 
   
methods that include impulse responses and variance decompositions capture the dynamic 
relationships between the variables. We next examine the variance decompositions.  
 
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Variance decomposition breaks down the variance of the forecast error into components 
that can be attributed to each of the endogenous variables. Specifically, it provides a break down 
of the variance of the n-step ahead forecast errors of variable i which is accounted for by the 
innovations in variable j in the VAR. As in the case of the orthogonalized impulse response 
functions, the orthogonalized forecast error variance decompositions are also not invariant to the 
ordering of the variables in the VAR. Thus, we use the generalized variance decomposition 
which considers the proportion of the n-step ahead forecast errors of xt which is explained by 
conditioning on the non-orthogonalized shocks but explicitly allows for the contemporaneous 
correlation between these shocks and the shocks to the other equations in the system. 
  As  opposed  to  the  orthogonalized  decompositions,  the  generalized  error  variance 
decompositions can add up to more or less than 100 percent depending on the strength of the 
covariances between the different errors.   
    
   
6. Empirical Results 
 
Nonstationarity, Cointegration and Granger causality 
 
We first test for nonstationarity of all the variables. The results summarized in Table 3 
shows that all the variables can be treated as nonstationary. Testing for differences of each 
variable confirms that all the variables are integrated of order one.  
 
Since the variables are integrated of order one, cointegration analysis  is applied to 
examine the relationships between these non-mean reverting series. We use Johansen‟s FIML 
technique to test for cointegration between each of the interest rates, repo rate, rate of growth 
of  high  powered  money,  inflation,  interest  rate  spread,  foreign  interest  rate  and  forward 
premium. For all interest rates, the maximum eigenvalue test statistic strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis  that  there  is  no  cointegration  between  the  variables  but  does  not  reject  the 
hypothesis that there is one cointegrating relationship between the variables for each interest 
rate. As reported in Table 4, the cointegrating vector for each interest rate suggests that each  
interest rate is positively related with the repo rate, rate of growth of high powered money, 
inflation rate, interest rate spread, foreign interest rate and forward premium.  The signs are 
therefore theoretically plausible and conform with the discussion in Section 3. The positive 20 
   
sign  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  money  supply  suggests  that  the  expected  inflation  effect 
outweighs the liquidity effect.  
The next step is to test whether the variables individually Granger cause each of the 
interest rates. The results reported in Table 5 indicate that the null hypothesis of no Granger 
causality is strongly rejected in Models A through D, thus justifying the inclusion of the right 
hand side variables in the model.   
To gauge the relative importance of the influences on interest rates we analyse the 
impact of each of these variables further. We investigate the dynamic interaction of various 
shocks  using  the  variance  decomposition  function.  Instead of  the  orthogonalized  impulse 
responses,  we  use  the  generalized  impulse  responses  and  variance  decompositions.  The 
advantage of using the generalized impulse responses is that orthogonalized impulse response 
and variance decompositions depend on the ordering of the variables. If the shocks to the 
respective equations in VAR are contemporaneously correlated, then the orthogonalized and 
generalized impulse responses may be quite different. On the other hand, if shocks are not 
contemporaneously  correlated,  then  the  two  types  of  impulse  responses  may  not  be  that 
different and also orthogonalized impulse responses may not be sensitive to a re-ordering of 




Generalized variance decompositions  
Variance  decompositions  give  the  proportion  of  the  h-periods-ahead  forecast  error 
variance of a variable that can be attributed to another variable. These therefore measure the 
proportion of the forecast error variance in the interest rates that can be explained by shocks 
given to its determinants. Results reported in Tables 6A-6D provide variance decompositions for 
up to the 24-week forecast horizon for each interest rate.  
 
  Table 7 gives the prorated percentage decompositions for the 24-week forecast horizon. 
This therefore allows us to analyse the relative importance of the determinants of interest rates 
for each interest rate as well as across interest rates. For instance, for the 15-91 days Treasury 
bill  rate,  important  determinants  in  descending  order  of  importance  include  the  forward 
premium, inflation rate, and the rate of growth of high powered money. In the case of 1-year 
Government  securities,  the  importance  of  the  inflation  rate  and  the  forward  premium  are 
switched and the remaining ordering for the three most important variables is the same as that of 
the 15-91 Treasury bill rate. As we move towards longer maturity rates, the weight of the repo 
rate and the forward premium diminishes while the weight of the interest rate spread and the 
own  variable  increases  substantially.  The  inflation  rate  is  also  relatively  less  important  in 21 
   
explaining variations in the 10-year rate. The results also show that a large proportion of the 
variation in the rates on the 5-year and 10-year government securities is attributed to the interest 
rate itself suggesting that the unexplained variation may be a result of cyclical factors that are 
important for longer term rates and are not captured in the interest rate spread but are omitted 




  This paper examines the determinants of the term structure of interest rates in India using 
weekly data from April 2001 through March 2009. The analysis covers Treasury Bills with 
residual maturity of 15-91 days and Government securities of residual maturity one, five and ten 
years respectively. The empirical estimates show that a long-run relationship exists between 
each of these interest rates and repo rate (policy rate), rate of growth of high powered money, 
inflation,  interest  rate  spread,  foreign  interest  rate  and  forward  premium.  These  variables 
Granger  cause  each  of  the  interest  rates.  Furthermore,  the  normalized  generalized  variance 
decompositions suggest that the policy rate is more important in explaining the proportion of 
variation  in  short  to  medium  term  interest  rates.  The  weight  of  the  forward  premium  also 
diminishes as we move towards higher maturity interest rates. The inflation rate and the rate of 
growth of high powered money are also relatively less important in explaining variations in the 
10-year rate. The results also show that a large proportion of the variation in the rates on the 5-
year and 10-year government securities is attributed to the interest rate itself suggesting that the 
unexplained variation may be a result of cyclical factors that are important for longer term rates 
but are omitted from the estimations due to the high frequency of data employed.  These are 
cyclical factors that are not captured in the interest rate spread.  
The paper thus highlights the differential response of the short and the longer rates to 
the various determinants including monetary policy. Interest rates at the shorter end of the 
maturity spectrum are more responsive to changes in monetary policy measured by policy 
rates and the rate of growth of high powered money. This impact peters-out as the maturity 
increases, showing that the longer term rates are influenced by an additional set of factors like 
current and future economic activity, output gap, fiscal policy and the global environment.   22 
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Table 1: Interest Rates – Summary Statistics: 6
th April ’01 to 27
th March ’09 
 
Interest Rates  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Standard Deviation 
i(TB15-91)  5.89  9.09   (22
nd Aug „08)  2.88  (3
rd Aug ‟07)  1.14 
i(GSec1)  6.48  9.85  (4
th July ‟08)  3.66  (26
th Sep ‟03)  1.35 
i(GSec5)  6.93  9.78 (6
th April ‟01)  4.81 (10
th Oct ‟03)  1.11 
i(GSec10)  7.42  10.64 (6
th April‟01)  5.18  (7




Table 2A: Correlation-Matrix: 6
th April ‘01 to 27
th March ’09 
 
Variables  i(TB15-91)  i(GSec1)  i(GSec5)  i(GSec10) 
i(TB15-91)  1.000       
i(GSec1)  0.917  1.000     
i(GSec5)  0.877  0.926  1.000   
i(GSec10)  0.818  0.844  0.919  1.000 
π   0.389  0.466  0.360  0.136 
Spread  -0.234  -0.057  0.134  0.367 
Repo Rate  0.807  0.808  0.791  0.851 
dm  0.402  0.497  0.458  0.275 
i*1  0.508  0.567  0.673  0.587 
i*2  0.496  0.556  0.668  0.577 
fp1  0.492  0.421  0.413  0.496 
fp2  0.474  0.400  0.412  0.534 
 
Note: π denotes inflation(y-o-y); dm denotes growth rate of high powered money (y-o-y); i*1 and i*2 denote libor 
3-months and 6-months respectively; fp1 and fp2 denote 3-months and 6-months forward premia respectively. 
 
 
Table 2B: Correlation-Matrix: 6
th April ’01 to 27
th March ‘09 
 
Variables  Π  Spread  Repo rate  dm  libor1  fp1  libor2  fp2 
π  1.0000               
spread  -0.3978  1.0000             
Repo Rate  0.0524  0.1338  1.0000           
dm  0.4969  -0.1846  0.2468  1.0000         
libor1  0.1148  0.1699  0.5001  0.5150  1.0000       
fp1  -0.0851  0.0419  0.5328  -0.2128  -0.0780  1.0000     
libor2  0.1306  0.1727  0.4663  0.5052  0.9957  -0.0751  1.0000   
fp2  -0.1900  0.1359  0.5890  -0.2394  -0.0809  0.9748  -0.0877  1.0000 
 
 26 
   
 
 
Table 3: ADF and DF-GLS Tests (constant and trend): 6
th April ’01 to 27
th March ’09 
 
Variables  ADF(4)  DF-GLS(4)  Inference 
i(TB15-91)  -2.53  -1.62  I(1) 
i(GSec1)  -2.35  -1.14  I(1) 
i(GSec5)  -2.87  -0.98  I(1) 
i(GSec10)  -2.84  -0.79  I(1) 
π  -2.23  -2.22  I(1) 
Spread  -3.75
*  -2.61  I(1) 
Repo Rate  -0.86  -0.99  I(1) 
dm  -2.00  -2.15  I(1) 
i*1  -0.888  -0.68  I(1) 
i*2  -1.05  -0.75  I(1) 
fp1  -3.34  -3.30*  I(1) 
fp2   -2.84  -2.72  I(1) 
Critical Values 
1%  -3.98(ADF)  -3.48(DF-GLS) 
5%  -3.42(ADF)  -2.87(DF-GLS) 
 
Note: π denotes inflation(y-o-y); dm denotes growth rate of high powered money (y-o-y); i*1 and i*2 denote libor 
3-months and 6-months respectively; fp1 and fp2 denote 3-months and 6-months forward premia respectively. * 




  Table 4: Cointegrating Vectors (Normalised Values) 
 
Interest Rates/ Variables  Π  Spread  Repo rate  dm  i*1  i*2  fp1  fp2 
i(TB15-91)  0.067  0.357  0.449  0.068  0.099    0.276   
i(GSec1)  0.069  0.038  0.446  0.111    0.185    0.310 
i(GSec5)  0.052  0.685  0.451  0.109    0.128    0.251 
i(GSec10)  0.034  1.420  0.302  0.131    0.057    0.315 27 
   
 
Table 5: Granger Causality Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis  Number of Lags  χ
2 (calculated)  Conclusion 
Model A: i(TB15-91)=f(π, Spread, Repo Rate, dm, i*1, fp1) 
 
i(TB15-91) is not Granger caused by Inflation  4  42.99(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(TB15-91) is not Granger caused by Spread  4  39.58(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(TB15-91) is not Granger caused by Repo Rate  4  39.47(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(TB15-91) is not Granger caused by dm  4  39.47(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(TB15-91) is not Granger caused by libor1  4  53.62(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(TB15-91) is not Granger caused by fp1  4  72.96(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
Model B: i(GSec1)=f(π, Spread, Repo Rate, dm,  i*2, fp2) 
i(GSec1) is not Granger caused by Inflation  4  55.49(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec1) is not Granger caused by Spread  4  45.44(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec1) is not Granger caused by Repo Rate  4  53.08(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec1) is not Granger caused by dm  4  46.03(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec1) is not Granger caused by libor2  4  60.35(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec1) is not Granger caused by fp2  4  80.44(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
Model C: i(GSec5)=f(π, Spread, Repo Rate, dm, i*2, fp2) 
i(GSec5) is not Granger caused by Inflation  4  38.41(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec5) is not Granger caused by Spread  4  28.85(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec5) is not Granger caused by Repo Rate  4  32.54(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec5) is not Granger caused by dm  4  32.62(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec5) is not Granger caused by libor2  4  40.06(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec5) is not Granger caused by fp2  4  39.22(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
Model D: i(GSec10)=f(π, Spread, Repo Rate, dm, i*2, fp2) 
i(GSec10) is not Granger caused by Inflation  5  10.42(0.064)  Reject Null Hypothesis** 
i(GSec10) is not Granger caused by Spread  5  12.16(0.033)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec10) is not Granger caused by Repo Rate  5  14.83(0.011)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec10) is not Granger caused by dm  5  30.09(0.000)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec10) is not Granger caused by libor2  5  13.84(0.017)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
i(GSec10) is not Granger caused by fp2  5  15.29(0.009)  Reject Null Hypothesis 
 
Note: π denotes inflation(y-o-y); dm denotes growth rate of high powered money (y-o-y); i*1 and i*2 denote libor 
3-months and 6-months respectively; fp1 and fp2 denote 3-months and 6-months forward premia respectively. ** 
denotes significance at 10%. 
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TB15-91  π   Spread  Repo  dm  i*1  fp1 
1  0.95659                      0.0023519  0.49338  0.0097892  0.0056826  0.022104  0.024017 
6  0.66097                          0.045252  0.29212  0.030913  0.040763  0.019646  0.20995 
12  0.42943                             0.13221  0.17655  0.048194  0.091149  0.026702  0.25439 
18  0.30783                             0.19282  0.12667  0.054301  0.11897  0.028781  0.26277 
24  0.24011                             0.22917  0.10018  0.057298  0.13446  0.029727  0.26516 
 




GSec1  π   Spread  Repo  dm  i*2  fp2 
1  0.95483                        0.0067428  0.042988  0.031366  0.027126  0.0020619  0.038903 
6  0.58171                           0.082798  0.030437  0.049748  0.17347  0.033567  0.18976 
12  0.32889                             0.17896  0.013824  0.052816  0.31447  0.039118  0.19823 
18  0.20642                          0.23394  0.0081925  0.049643  0.38384  0.035027  0.18850 
24  0.14437                         0.26449  0.0065186  0.046616  0.41858  0.031283  0.17911 
 




GSec5  π   Spread  Repo  dm  i*2  fp2 
1  0.98199                        0.0019240  0.5660E-3  0.0078502  0.015337  0.046571  0.0033079 
6  0.75714                          0.047156  0.037837  0.010030  0.084495  0.11294  0.056630 
12  0.55675                             0.11426  0.10208  0.014719  0.15789  0.10128  0.068138 
18  0.44312                              0.15722  0.14335  0.016826  0.19485  0.087393  0.069564 
24  0.37912                             0.18249  0.16746  0.017854  0.21449  0.078211  0.069411 
 




GSec10  π   Spread  Repo  dm  i*2  fp2 
1  0.98770                      0.0037243  0.30969  0.0066390  0.0025501  0.032108  0.0012957 
6  0.88666                        0.0050950  0.27773  0.0097539  0.015775  0.054363  0.067526 
12  0.83765                          0.016690  0.33523  0.0083551  0.026091  0.068839  0.079243 
18  0.79438                          0.030938  0.37598  0.0075495  0.040897  0.068585  0.081038 
24  0.76117                         0.042917  0.40291  0.0069474  0.052893  0.065937  0.080252 
 
Note: a) π denotes inflation(y-o-y); dm denotes growth rate of high powered money (y-o-y); i*1 and i*2 denote 
libor  3-months  and  6-months  respectively;  fp1  and  fp2  denote  3-months  and  6-months  forward  premia 
respectively. 
b): Entries in each row are the percentages of the variances of the forecast error in the respective interest rate 
that can be attributed to each of the variables indicated in the column headings. The decompositions are reported 
for one-, six-, twelve-, eighteen- and twenty four-week horizons. The extent to which the generalized error 
variance decompositions add up to more or less than 100 percent depends on the strength of the covariances 
between the different errors.  
 




  Interest 
Rates 
π  Spread  Repo  dm  i*1  i*2  fp1  fp2 
24  Model A:i(TB15-91)  21.78  18.49  8.45  3.88  17.05  4.22    26.10   
Model B:i(GSec1)  11.39  33.25  1.09  1.78  32.92    2.42    17.12 
Model C:i(GSec5)  32.62  22.91  7.91  1.34  21.82    7.74    5.63 




   
Annexure 1 
DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
   
Variable  Definition  Source 
Bank rate  Rate at which the RBI lends to the commercial banks  Handbook of 
Statistics on the 
Indian Economy and 
RBI Bulletin 
CRR  Cash reserve Ratio (CRR) is the amount of funds that the banks have to keep with RBI. If 
RBI decides to increase the percent of this, the available amount with the banks comes 
down. RBI is using this method (increase of CRR rate), to drain out the excessive money 
from the banks. 
 
-do- 
TB 15-91  Government of  India Treasury Bills of residual maturity  of 15-91 days based on the 
secondary market outright transactions in Government securities (face value) as reported 
in Subsidiary Government Ledger (SGL) accounts at RBI, Mumbai.  
-do- 
GSEC1  Government  of  India  dated  securities  of  residual  maturity  of  one-year  based  on  the 
secondary market outright transactions in Government securities (face value) as reported 
in Subsidiary Government Ledger (SGL) accounts at RBI, Mumbai.  
-do- 
GSEC5  Government  of  India  dated  securities  of  residual  maturity  of  five-years  based  on the 
secondary market outright transactions in Government securities (face value) as reported 
in Subsidiary Government Ledger (SGL) accounts at RBI, Mumbai. 
-do- 
GSEC10  Government of India dated securities of residual maturity of ten-years and above based on 
the  secondary  market  outright  transactions  in  Government  securities  (face  value)  as 




Three-month LIBOR on USD deposits  IFS 
LIBOR 6-
months 
Six-month LIBOR on USD deposits  IFS 
Repo  Repo rate is the rate at which the central bank lends to the commercial banks against their 
parking  of  Government  and  other  approved  securities  for  meeting  their  day  to  day 
liquidity requirements or to fill short-term gaps. 
Handbook of 
Statistics on the 
Indian Economy and 
RBI Bulletin 
Reverse Repo  Reverse Repo rate is the rate which the central bank offers to the commercial banks when 
they  park  their  excess  funds  with it  by  purchase  of  Government  and  other  approved 
securities which they sell off after the stipulated period. 
-do- 
SLR  The Statutory Liquidity Ratio is the amount a commercial bank needs to maintain in the 
form of liquid assets for prudential reasons and safety of depositors. It can be in cash, or 
gold or Govt. approved securities (Bonds) before providing credit to its customers. SLR 
rate is determined and maintained by the RBI (Reserve Bank of India) in order to control 
the expansion of bank credit. 
-do- 
fp 3-months  Three-month forward premium  -do- 
fp 6-months  Six-month forward premium  -do- 
INFLATION  Both week-to-week and year-on-year inflation rate have been used.  Weekly Statistical 
Supplement 
dm  Growth in high powered money year on year  -do- 
SPREAD  The yield spread is defined as the difference between the Government of India dated 
securities on residual maturity of ten-years and above and the 15-91-days Treasury bills 
rate 
-do- 
 
 